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Introduction 
G. E. M. Anscombe is widely recognised as one of the most brilliant philosophers of the twentieth century. 
Donald Davidson described her 1957 monograph Intention as the most important work on action since 
Aristotle’s Ethics, and her much anthologised paper ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ (1958) is the genesis of 
contemporary virtue ethics. Anscombe’s claim that ‘I’ is not a referring expression (in her 1975), remains 
as a provocative counterpoint to the consensus position among philosophers of mind. Alongside her own 
writing, she edited and translated much of Wittgenstein’s work. Her translation of the Philosophical 
Investigations—a task which also involved substantial editorial work—is viewed by many as authoritative. 
Given these credentials, one might expect to find Anscombe’s work well represented in the secondary 
literature. But in fact, only a tiny proportion of her published writings has attracted critical engagement. As 
this bibliography highlights, some areas of Anscombe’s thought—for example, her writings on memory, 
mental events and sensation—have received almost no attention in the literature, despite their insight and 
relevance; and even where her work has made a significant impact—for example, in ethics and 
causation—it has not been subject to scholarly study. It is really only in the area of philosophy of action 
that substantial and high quality discussion of her thought has taken place. To date, the literature contains 
no detailed discussion of Anscombe’s philosophical method. Her main interlocutors are Hume and 
Descartes, and her contemporaries at Oxford—R. M. Hare, J. L. Austin and Stuart Hampshire. Her aim is 
to recover pre-modern thinking—in particular the thinking of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas—about core 
topics in mind, metaphysics, epistemology and ethics (for example, human nature, mind-body relation, 
causation, substance, sensation, perception, human action, practical reason). However, her methods are 
those of philosophy post the linguistic-turn. In particular, she follows Frege and, more explicitly, 
Wittgenstein in thinking that the way to study these topics is not as a scientist but as a logician or 
grammarian. Her concern is not the properties of material (or immaterial) objects but the formal order that 
belongs to our concepts and to human life in which they have their home. This explains the deep 
interconnectedness that is a feature of her work. 
 
General Overviews  
Teichmann 2008 is currently the only overview of Anscombe’s work taken as a whole. Teichmann is a 
reliable guide, covers the core areas of Anscombe’s thought, and usefully puts her in conversation with 
Aristotle, Hume and Wittgenstein. Discussion often lacks the depth to satisfy a reader looking to 
understand the more difficult and puzzling aspects of her view and  there is no substantial engagement 
with Anscombe’s Thomism. The introduction and first two chapters of Wiseman 2016 contain the only 
general discussion of Anscombe’s method and its relation to Wittgenstein’s. The online **Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy** article on Anscombe (Driver 2011) is thin and the bibliography out of date; 
the discussion of Anscombe’s philosophy of action is very much out-of-step with the current interpretative 
orthodoxy (such as it is). Some useful background to Anscombe’s life, as well as impressionistic 
discussion her key ideas, can be found Teichman 2002 and Gormally 2012. Kenny 2016 and Gibson 
2016 provide background to Anscombe’s time at Oxford and Cambridge.  
 
Driver, Julia, 2011. ‘*Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret 
Anscombe[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/anscombe/]*.’ Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (2011).  
Short overview divided into (1) Life (2) Wittgenstein’s influence (3) Metaphysics (4) Action Theory (5) 
Moral philosophy; limited and dated bibliography. Not to be taken as authoritative. 
 
Gibson, Arthur. “Anscombe, Cambridge, and the Challenges of Wittgenstein” in John Haldane (ed.) 
Elizabeth Anscombe: American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 90, Issue no. 2, Spring 2016, 
191-206 
Idiosyncratic but revealing reflections on Anscombe’s relation with Wittgenstein and his male acolytes.  
 
Gormally, Luke. ‘G. E. M. Anscombe: 1919 – 2001’. Encyclopedia of Catholic Social Thought, Social 
Science and Social Policy, Volume 3, edited by Michael L Coulter, Richard S Myers and Joseph A 
Varacalli (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2012) 
A clear overview of Anscombe’s life and thought; focusses on the ethical and religious character of her 
work. Helpful for context and introduction but no deep philosophical discussion. 
 
Kenny, Anthony. “Elizabeth Anscombe at Oxford,” in John Haldane (ed.) Elizabeth Anscombe: American 
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 90, Issue no. 2, Spring 2016, 181-90. 
Recollections of Anscombe’s time at Oxford, including her opposition to Truman’s degree and the 
publication and reception of *Intention*. 
 
Teichman, Jenny, 2002. “Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe: 1919–2001,” in Biographical Memoirs 
of Fellows I (Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume 115), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 31–50 
Clear and helpful short introductory survey of the most important works in Collected Papers II and III (see 
*Collections*); some bibliographical information.  
 
Teichmann, Roger. The Philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
A reliable and readable introduction though lacking interpretative depth. Would be good background 
reading for undergraduates but would need to be supplemented. 
 
Wiseman, Rachael. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Anscombe and Intention, Routledge, 2016. 
Guidebook to Intention, with early chapters on Anscombe’s life, philosophical method, and the influence 
of her Catholicism. Suitable reading for undergraduates and postgraduates. 
 
Anthologies 
There are two series of collected papers.. Three volumes of **Collected Philosophical Papers** were 
selected and edited by Anscombe herself, and published in 1981 by Blackwell with introductions by 
Anscombe. These bring together largely previously published material in history of philosophy 
(*Parmenides to Wittgenstein*), metaphysics (*Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind*) and ethics 
(*Ethics, Religion and Politics). Following Anscombe’s death, her executors have undertaken to publish 
four volumes of essays, in the St Andrews Studies in Philosophy and Public Affairs series. Many of the 
essays in the first two volumes of this second set of anthologies (*Human Life, Action and Ethics*, *Faith 
in a Hard Ground*) were written by Anscombe as talks for  Catholic—rather than philosophical—
audiences. This means that in these papers Anscombe often takes for granted a shared moral and 
religious outlook and philosophical discussion arises out of, or in the service of, doctrinal issues or 
questions that arise within Catholic moral theology. They contain some of Anscombe’s more 
provocative—and widely criticised—writing on sex, contraception, and marriage. The papers collected in 
*From Plato to Wittgenstein* and *Logic, Truth and Meaning* display the marriage of ancient and 
medieval metaphysics to twentieth-century linguistic philosophy that is characteristic of Anscombe’s 
approach. Many of the papers in the St Andrew’s  volumes were unpublished in her lifetime and they are 
in general not of the same quality as those contained in the Blackwell volumes. Nevertheless, they 
contain many excellent pieces, as well as helpful introductions by the philosopher Mary Geach, 
Anscombe’s daughter.  
 
From Parmenides to Wittgenstein: Collected Philosophical Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe, volume i 
(Oxford: Blackwell, and Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1981) [a] 
Historically-focussed discussions of topics in philosophical logic and metaphysics, half from Ancient 
sources and half from Medieval and Modern (post-Cartesian, including 20th Century) philosophy. Topics 
include Plato’s theory of forms, practical truth in Aristotle, Hume on causation and linguistic idealism and 
Wittgenstein’s later work.  
 
Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind: Collected Philosophical Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe, volume ii 
(Oxford: Blackwell, and Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1981) [b] 
Contains several important and well-known papers (including ‘The First Person’ (1975), ‘On Sensations of 
Position’ (1962) and ‘Causality and Determination’ (1971)) as well as many excellent papers on 
perception, time and philosophy of mind that deserve to be better known. 
 
Ethics, Religion and Politics: Collected Philosophical Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe, volume iii (Oxford: 
Blackwell, and Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1981) [c] 
Includes the much anthologised ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ (1958), along with nine other papers on 
ethics, two on philosophy of religion and two on political philosophy; these papers usefully contextualise 
and expand the themes of ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’.  
 
Human Life, Action and Ethics, M. Geach and L. Gormally eds (St. Andrew’s Studies in Philosophy and 
Public Affairs; Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2005) [d] 
M. Geach’s introduction gives some of the historical and philosophical background to Anscombe’s work 
on action and ethics. Highlight essays include ‘The Causation of Action’ (1983), ‘Does Oxford Moral 
Philosophy Corrupt the Youth?’ (1957) and ‘Action, Intention and “Double Effect”’ (1982). 
 
Faith in a Hard Ground, M. Geach and L. Gormally eds (St. Andrew’s Studies in Philosophy and Public 
Affairs; Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2008) [e] 
M. Geach’s introduction describes the place of Anscombe’s faith in her life and work. Many of 
Anscombe’s most controversial and reviled pieces are collected here, including several on abortion and 
contraception. 
 From Plato to Wittgenstein, M. Geach and L. Gormally eds (St. Andrew’s Studies in Philosophy and 
Public Affairs; Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2011) [f] 
M. Geach’s introduction provides some illumination of Anscombe’s relationship with Wittgenstein and his 
thought, and discusses her distinctive approach to texts in the history of philosophy. It contains also  
essays on Plato, Anselm, Spinoza, and Hume, and seven papers on Wittgenstein’s work and method, 
which together present Anscombe’s understanding of the notion of ‘grammar’ and ‘grammatical 
investigation’. 
 
Logic, Truth, and Meaning, M. Geach and L. Gormally eds (St. Andrew’s Studies in Philosophy and Public 
Affairs; Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2016) [g] 
Reprints her Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (1959) along with thirteen further essays on the 
Tractatus, including discussions of the picture theory, the ‘general form of proposition’, solipsism, and 
generality. The remaining thirteen essays tackle problems in philosophical logic—thought, belief, truth, 
meaning and existence. 
 
Collections 
The most important collection of exegetical essays is undoubtedly Ford, Hornsby and Stoutland (2011). 
The quality and depth of this collection represents a revival of interest in Anscombe’s **Intention** (1957), 
and renewed scholarly efforts to recover her philosophy of action and to demonstrate the depth of its 
challenge to the contemporary Davidsonian orthodoxy in that field. The exegetical literature is currently 
exploding, and many more collections are soon to be forthcoming. Haldane 2016, which contains quality 
contributions from some excellent scholars, takes as its subject ‘Elizabeth Anscombe’, and as such 
ranges over many topics. Gormally, Jones and Teichmann 2016 focusses on Anscombe’s moral 
philosophy and is the first collection to tackle papers published in *Human Life, Action and Ethics* and 
*Faith in a Hard Ground*. Earlier **Festschrifts**—Diamond and Teichman (1979) and Gormally (1994), 
—have been far less influential, and are patchy in quality, though Diamond and Teichman (1979) contains 
a number of good essays on ‘I’ and Cora Diamond’s important essay *‘Frege and Nonsense’*.  Two Royal 
Institute of Philosophy Supplements, Teichmann 2000 (*Logic Cause and Action*) and O’Hear 2004 
(*Modern Moral Philosophy*) contains some excellent pieces inspired by, or in dialogue with, Anscombe 
work.  
 
Diamond, Cora & Teichman, Jenny, eds. Intention and Intentionality: Essays in Honour of G. E. M. 
Anscombe. Cornell University Press, 1979. 
Four groups of essays discussing (i) The First Person, (ii) Action and Intention, (iii) Sense and nonsense 
and (iv) Time, truth and necessity. Varied in subject and quality. Kenny’s ‘The First Person’ and 
Diamond’s ‘Frege and Nonsense’ are excellent papers. 
 Ford, A., J. Hornsby, F. Stoutland, eds. Essays on Anscombe’s Intention (Harvard University Press, 
2011). 
Currently the most important collection on Anscombe’s Intention; stand-out contributions are Moran and 
Stone (2011), Hornsby (2011), McDowell (2011), Haddock (2011). The contributors are mostly 
philosophers of action working in the analytic tradition, so their focus is on the distinctiveness of 
Anscombe’s philosophy of action from Davidson’s. Difficult but rewarding. 
 
Gormally, Luke, ed. Moral Truth and Moral Meaning: Essays in Honour of Peter Geach and Elizabeth 
Anscombe. Four Courts Press 1994. 
Catholic Festschrift, celebrating Geach and Anscombe’s golden wedding anniversary; essays strongly 
focussed on questions of Catholic moral theology including contraception, chastity, parental authority.  
 
Gormally, Luke, David Albert Jones and Roger Teichmann, eds. The Moral Philosophy of Elizabeth 
Anscombe. Imprint Academia 2016. 
Many of these essays are the first discussions of papers published in *Human Life, Action and Ethics* 
and *Faith in a Hard Ground*. Includes *Muller 2016* on the spirituality of man, *Volger 2016* on 
promising and *O’Brien 2016* on obligation in Anscombe’s moral philosophy.  
 
Haldane, John, ed. Elizabeth Anscombe. Special edition of American Catholic Philosophical 
Quarterly, Volume 90, Issue 2, Spring 2016 
Collection of 13 essays from prominent Anscombe scholars most of whom focus on topics in the 
philosophy of action and philosophical logic. Also includes two biographical pieces by Kenny (Elizabeth 
Anscombe at Oxford’) and Gibson (‘Anscombe, Cambridge and the Challenges of Wittgenstein’).  
 
Teichmann R., ed. Logic, Cause and Action: Essays in Honor of G. E. M. Anscombe (Royal Institute of 
Philosophy Supplement: 46) April 2000. 
Very good collection of ten high-quality papers, the most significant of which are Harcourt (2000), 
Hursthouse (2000), and Foot (2000).  
 
O’Hear, Anthony ed. Modern Moral Philosophy. (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement: 54) April 
2000. 
This collection takes its title from Anscombe’s essay but is not commentary; rather her essay forms the 
backdrop to many of its papers, which cover topics including good action, practical inference, absolutism 
and authority. 
 
Action   
Anscombe’s major work is **Intention** (1957). This area of Anscombe’s thought has attracted the most 
interest in the secondary literature. Of particular interest is Anscombe’s concepts of ‘knowledge without 
observation’ and ‘practical knowledge’, which contemporary philosophers of mind have sought to make 
use of to solve the so-called mind-body problem (McDowell 2011, Martin 1971, Thompson 2011, Setiya 
2008). Work published after Davidson 1963 and before Ford, Hornsby, and Stoutland 2011 tended to 
underplay the distinction between Davidson’s causalist account of action and Anscombe’s position while 
focussing on the so-called ‘Davidson-Anscombe thesis’ of action identity (Driver 2011). This reading of 
Anscombe’s project (as preparatory notes to Davidson) has now been widely rejected; criticisms by 
Hornsby (2011), Moran and Stone (2011), and Haddock (2011) have been particularly influential, as has 
increased recognition of the Thomist roots of **Intention** (Schwenkler 2015, Vogler 2002). **Intention** 
should be read alongside other important papers which elucidate its central concepts: under a 
description, non-observational knowledge, practical reason, causation of action (‘**On Brute Facts**’1958, 
‘**Under a Description**’ 1979, ‘**The Causation of Action**’ 1983, ‘**Practical Inference**’ 1989). The 
book must also be seen in light of Anscombe’s reading of Aristotle on practical truth (‘Practical 
Truth’1992) and of Aquinas’s account of good and bad human action (2005). A series of polemical papers 
written at the same time as **Intention** (‘Mr Truman’s Degree’ 1956, ‘Does Oxford Moral Philosophy 
Corrupt the Youth?’ 1957, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ 1958) illuminate the book’s relation to Anscombe’s 
broader ethical, religious and political aims, and its relevance to topics in Catholic moral theology.  
  
Intention 
Anscombe (1957) is Anscombe’s earliest and major work on action, with later work elucidating and 
contextualising its major claims.  Early reviews are on the whole unhelpful, with the exception of Baier 
1960 and Jarvis 1959. Wiseman 2016 is the first guidebook to this difficult monograph. Stoutland 2011 is 
a short but comprehensive overview of the book’s structure and Teichmann 2008 contains useful 
discussion in chs 1-2. Davidson 1963 is important as the genesis of the so-called ‘Anscombe-Davidson 
thesis’ described in Driver 2011. The interpretative school arising from this misnomer is compellingly 
challenged in Moran and Stone 2011. (See *Introduction* for further details.) Thompson 2012 and Vogler 
2002 are important monographs showing how an Anscombian account of intention can generate a moral 
philosophy  
 
Anscombe, G. E. M. Intention. Oxford: Blackwell, 1957. 
Difficult, deep and short, this monograph was described by Davidson as the most important work on 
action since Aristotle.  
 
Anscombe, G.E.M. “’Under a Description.’” Nous 13 (1979): 219-33. Reprinted in [b] 
Illuminating paper aiming to correct some misunderstandings about the meaning of ‘under a description’; 
essential reading for anyone seeking to understanding Anscombe 1957. 
 Baier, Kurt. “Critical notice”. Australisian Journal of Philosophy 38:1 (1969): 71-81.  
Perceptive and helpful review identifying both Anscombe’s target and her positive thesis.  
 
Davidson, Donald. “Actions, Reasons, and causes.” Journal of Philosophy 60:23 (1963): 685 – 700.  
An important essay due to its formative effect on subsequent readers of Anscombe 1957; it is only in 
recent years (esp. Moran and Stone 2011; Hornsby 2011; Wiseman 2016) that the mistaken view of 
Anscombe as a precursor to Davidson has been seriously challenged. 
 
Jarvis, Judith. “Review.” The Journal of Philosophy 56:1 (Jan 1, 1959): 31 – 41. 
Sympathetic review, extensive discussion of sections on practical reason. 
 
Moran, Richard and Martin Stone. “Anscombe on Expression of Intention: An Exegesis.” In Ford, Hornsby 
and Stoutland 2011, 33 – 75. 
Important and careful exegetical essay, demonstrating the failures of the Davidsonian reading of 
Anscombe 1957, and beginning to elucidate an alternative. 
 
Thompson, Michael. Life and Action: Elementary Structures of Practice and Practical Thought. Harvard: 
Harvard University Press, 2012.   
Important monograph proposing so-called ‘naïve action theory’, grounded in Anscombe 1957.  
 
Wiseman, Rachael. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Anscombe’s Intention. London: Routledge, 
2016. 
The only guidebook to Anscombe 1957; a resource for students and academics. 
 
Practical Knowledge  
This topic—familiar to readers of Thomas Aquinas—is introduced into modern philosophy of action by 
Anscombe 1957. Anscombe says that the knowledge that a man has of his intentional actions is practical 
knowledge and also that the descriptions of a man’s actions belong to the class of things he knows 
without observation. To this second class belong also descriptions of bodily posture. The exegetical 
literature on both these concepts is muddled by the fact that there is no agreement about the relation 
between practical, non-observational and self-knowledge in Anscombe’s thought, and so no consensus 
on whether the capacity to know the position of one’s limbs, the capacity to know what one is doing and 
the capacity to say what one intends are of the same species. Many of the best essays on these topics 
attend to this question (Haddock 2011, McDowell 2011). Moran 2004 is an important discussion of why 
practical knowledge must be non-observational. Thompson 2011 influentially seeks to make ‘the 
progressive’ a central notion in understanding practical knowledge. Schwenkler 2015 is an extremely 
helpful reminder that ‘practical knowledge’ has its roots in Aquinas—a fact that seems to have gone 
largely unnoticed by earlier interpreters. Setiya 2008 is a stand-out example from a more critical 
interpretative tradition.  
 
Anscombe, G. E. M. “Practical Truth.” In Working Papers in Law, Medicine and Philosophy. Edited by 
John M. Dolan. Program in Human Rights and Medicine of the University of Minnesota, 1993. Reprinted 
in [d]  
Discussion of Aristotle’s notion of ‘truth in agreement with right desire’; important for opening up the 
sense in which ‘practical knowledge’ might meet the truth condition on knowledge. 
 
Haddock, Adrian. “‘The Knowledge that a man has of his intentional actions’.” In Essays on Anscombe’s 
Intention. Edited by Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby and Frederick Stoutland 2011, 147–169. Harvard 
University Press, 2011. 
Careful exegetical piece highlighting many of the interpretative difficulties in this area. 
 
Moran, Richard. “Anscombe on ‘Practical Knowledge’.” In Agency and Actions: Royal Institute of 
Philosophy Supplement. Edited by John Hyman and Helen Steward, 43-68. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004.  
For many years the most significant and widely cited discussion of Anscombe on practical knowledge; 
remains relevant and influential. 
 
Setiya, Kieran. “Practical Knowledge.” Ethics 118:3 (2008): 388-409. 
An influential and widely cited paper connecting practical knowledge with non-propositional ‘knowledge-
how’. 
 
Schwenkler, John. “Understanding ‘Practical Knowledge’.” Philosophers’ Imprint 25:15 (June 2015). 
A helpful study of the Aristotelian and Thomistic roots of Anscombe’s conception of practical knowledge.  
 
Thompson, Michael. “Anscombe’s Intention and Practical Knowledge”. In Essays on Anscombe’s 
Intention. Edited by Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby and Frederick Stoutland 2011, 198 – 210. Harvard 
University Press, 2011. 
Rather chaotic paper, but influential in arguing that Anscombe’s notion of practical knowledge can be 
understood only if we recognise that the object of knowledge must be specified in the imperfective rather 
than perfective form. This underlines the contrast between Davidson’s and Anscombe’s action-theory. 
 
Bodily Knowledge 
Anscombe 1957 says that we know the position of our limbs without observation and offers as a criterion 
for non-observational knowledge the absence of ‘separately describable sensations’. Anscombe 1962 
seeks to clarify this claim, though many readers (e.g. Vesey 1963 and Martin 1971) continue to find the 
notion incoherent. Vesey 1963, Martin 1971, McDowell 2011 all focus on the significance of Anscombe’s 
claim for the so-called mind-body problem. Harcourt 2008 uses Anscombe’s remarks to explore the role 
of introspectibilia in perception. 
 
Anscombe, G. E. M.. “On Sensations of Position.” Analysis 22:3 (January 1962): 55 – 58. Reprinted in [b] 
Short clarificatory piece; usefully read alongside Anscombe 1965 and 1976. 
 
Harcourt, Edward. “Wittgenstein and Bodily Self-Knowledge.” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 77:2 (2008): 299–333 
Clearly and lucidly charts the space of options regarding bodily self-knowledge and uses the problematic 
to explore the role of instrospectibilia in perception. 
 
McDowell, John 2011. “Anscombe on Bodily Self-Knowledge.” In Essays on Anscombe’s Intention. Edited 
by Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby and Frederick Stoutland 2011, 128–146. Harvard University Press, 
2011. 
Challenge to Harcourt 2008; representative of the re-emergence of a Strawsonian tradition in recent 
Anscombe scholarship (see also Martin 1971). 
 
Martin, C. B. “Knowledge without Observation.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1: 1 (September 1971): 
15 – 24.  
Early work exploring usefulness of Anscombe’s criterion of non-observationality in securing Strawson’s 
privileged class of P-predicates; helpfully details many of the interpretative difficulties and points of 
interest. 
 
Vesey, G. N. A. “Knowledge Without Observation.” The Philosophical Review 72 (1963): 198 – 212. 
Clear and entertaining discussion of Anscombe 1957 and 1962, exploring the difficulties and the potential 
rewards of securing the claim that knowledge of bodily posture is a species of self-knowledge. 
 
Practical Reason 
Anscombe 1957 made practical reason a central topic in philosophy of action. It includes a substantial 
discussion of Aristotle’s account of practical reason (§§33-42); this account plays a crucial role in the 
book’s thesis. Anscombe 1989 (written in 1974, but published later) is a reply to Von Wright 1972, and is 
essential reading for anyone seeking to understand §§33-42. For further discussion of the contrast 
between practical and theoretical reason, see also Alvarez 2010 and Müller 1979. The significance of 
practical reason in Anscombe’s account of intention, and in particular her account of practical knowledge, 
has been seriously neglected in a secondary literature (though see Vogler 2001). More attention has 
been given to the relation between practical knowledge and non-observational knowledge, than on that 
between practical knowledge and practical reasoning.   
 
Alvarez, Maria. “Reasons for Acting and Practical Reasoning.” Ratio, XXIII (2010), 355 – 373 
Clear and helpful interpretation and defence of Anscombe’s claim that ‘I want to φ’ is not ordinarily a 
premise in practical reasoning.  
 
Anscombe, G. E. M. “Practical Inference.” In The Philosophy of Georg Henrik von Wright: Library of Living 
Philosophers Series Volume XIX. Edited by P. A. Schlipp and L. E. Hahn, 109 – 148. La Salle, Ill: Open 
Court, 1989. Reprinted in [d] 
Brilliant paper defending radical thesis about both practical and theoretical inference; read alongside 
Anscombe 1957 §§33-42. 
 
Müller, Anselm Winfied. “How Theoretical Is Practical Reason?” In Intention and Intentionality: Essays in 
Honour of G. E. M. Anscombe. Edited by Cora Diamond and Jennifer Teichman, 91–108. Sussex: 
Harvester Press, 1979. 
Takes up Anscombe’s discussion of practical reason (and Aristotle) from her 1957 (Intention) to address 
the question of whether practical reasoning can be thought of as theoretical reasoning in the service of 
practice.  
 
Vogler, Candace A. “Anscombe on Practical Inference.” In Varieties of Practical Reasoning. Edited by 
Elijah Millgram, 437 – 464, MIT Press, 2001.  
Excellent discussion of the relation between practical reason and practical knowledge, carefully situated 
in the context of inferentialism about practical reason.   
 
Von Wright, G. H.. “On So-Called Practical Inference.” Acta Sociologica 15:1 (1972): 39 – 53.  
Careful work illuminating the difficulties involved in connecting practical reasoning with action.  
 
Causation in Action 
Anscombe follows Aquinas to say that practical knowledge is ‘the cause of what it understands’ (1957, §
48), but she certainly does not mean the efficient cause. Just what she does mean is a locus of 
philosophical debate (see also *Practical Knowledge*). Her 1983 provides useful clues as to what she 
does not mean—Anscombe says that explanation of action by intention is not causal explanation, in the 
sense in which ‘moderns’ understand ‘causal’. This position is connected with another of Anscombe’s 
claims about intention: that to give the mental cause of an action is not to give a reason for the action 
(see Teichman 1961). As discussed in Hursthouse 2000, this claim puts her at odds with the Davidsonian 
orthodoxy in philosophy of action, according to which reason explanation is causal explanation. It is 
important to recognise that Anscombe’s pre-modern perspective leads her to recognise species of 
causation that are alien to post-Humean philosophy—this is a point developed in Hornsby 2011.  
 
Anscombe, G. E. M. “Intention.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 57 (1957), 321-32.  
Discussion of the distinction between giving a reason for acting and giving the mental cause of an action; 
composed of extracts from Anscombe 1957a, §§9-15. 
 
Anscombe, G. E. M. “The Causation of Action.” In Knowledge and Mind: Philosophical Essays. Edited by 
C. Ginet, 174–190. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. 
Argues that ‘four is not enough’ when it comes to recognising kinds of causes relevant to action; 
important extension of claim in Anscombe 1957a and 1957b that mental causes are not a topic for 
someone interested in the concept of intention. 
 
Hornsby, Jennifer. “Actions and Their Circumstances.” In Essays on Anscombe’s Intention. Edited by 
Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby and Frederick Stoutland, 105–127. Harvard University press, 2011. 
Extremely clear and careful essay setting out the deep divide between Anscombe and Davidson on the 
role and kind of causation in intentional action.  
 
Hursthouse, Rosalind. “Intention.” In Logic Cause and Action: Essays in Honor of G. E. M. Anscombe. 
Edited by Roger Teichmann, 83 – 106. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
Exploratory essay considering the way in which Anscombe 1957a bears on the causal theory of action.   
 
Teichman, J. “Mental Cause and Effect.” Mind 70:277 (1961): 36–52. 
Extremely clear and careful exposition of Anscombe’s account of mental causation.  
 
 
Metaphysics 
Anscombe’s works on causality and time are difficult and idiosyncratic but full of deep insight and replete 
with claims that cut against contemporary orthodoxy. Her ‘**Causality and Determination**' (1971) is well 
anthologised, and is the source of her reputation as champion of the singularist theory of causation. She 
is radically anti-Humean in her rejection of the nomonological and necessitating character of causation 
but also in the modern reduction of causation to a single kind: efficient. These strands of her thought have 
their roots in a radical view about the meaning of causative verbs (see Hornsby 2011 in *Action*). Her 
singularist pluralism is an essential part of her account of the causation of human action (1983) and 
relatedly of her view that intention and motive are not mental causes (**Intention** 1957; see *Action*). It 
is also part of a novel response to the problem of free will (1976). Her work on memory and the past is 
closely connected with her rejection of the Humean **Weltuanschauung** (as she puts it in her 1971), 
and showcases both her ability in philosophical logic and her Wittgensteinian roots, the latter of which is 
the subject of Diamond 1979. 
 
Anscombe, G. E. M. “The Reality of the Past.” In Philosophical Analysis. Edited by Max Black, 36-51, 
Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1950. 
Early paper offering a (Wittgensteinian) solution to puzzles about how past-tense statements have 
meaning. Anscombe’s proposed solution lies in the ways in which the past tense is taught and learnt. 
Read with her 1974.  
 
Anscombe, G. E. M. Causality and Determination. An Inaugural Lecture, Cambridge: University Press, 
1971. 1971 
Brilliant and radical rejection of the then prevailing (Humean) conception of causation, according to which 
causality involves necessary connection and causation implies a general law. Genesis of singularism 
about causation.  
 
Anscombe, G. E. M. “Memory, ‘Experience’ and Causation.” In Contemporary British Philosophy, 4th ser. 
Edited by H. D. Lewis, 15-29, London: Allen & Unwin, 1974.  
Attacks the definition of personal memory as experience plus truth plus causal connection. Claims we do 
not discover a causal connection between memory, experience and the past but rather call memory an 
effect of being a witness to a past event. Read with her 1950.  
 
Anscombe, G. E. M. “Soft Determinism.” In Contemporary Aspects of Philosophy. Edited by in G. Ryle, 
148-60, London Oriel Press, 1976.  
A subtle discussion of Lehrer’s argument (and Goldman’s and Davidson’s rebuttals) against subjunctive 
analyses of dispositions. 
 
Anscombe, G. E. M. “The Causation of Action.” In Knowledge and Mind: Philosophical Essays. Edited by 
in C. Ginet, 174–190, New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. 
Provocative discussion of the kinds of causation that are relevant to human action; argues that causal 
explanation at the level of the whole human agent is formally prior to explanation at the level of human 
physiology.  
 
Diamond, Cora. “Frege and Nonsense.”. In Cora Diamond and Jenny Teichman (eds). Intention and 
Intnetionality: Essays in Honour of G. E. M. Ansocmbe. Cornell University Press, 1979 
Takes Anscombe’s discussion of nonsense in ‘The Reality of the Past’ as starting point for understanding 
Frege’s conception of nonsense. Significant in making Anscombe central to the development of the ‘New 
Wittgenstein’ interpretative school.  
 
Philosophy of Mind 
Anscombe’s work on core topics in the philosophy of mind is strangely neglected. Her best known piece 
is her 1975, in which she argues that ‘I’ is not a referring expression. The claim, though almost universally 
rejected, has motivated some important discussion on the logic of the first-person pronoun and Cartesian 
philosophy of mind. It is notable that in defending the view Anscombe makes significant use of the notion 
of non-observational knowledge of action and posture; for her there is a deep connection between the no-
reference view and an account of action (see *Action*). She repeats the claim that ‘I’ is not a referring 
expression again in her 1976 where she connects it explicitly which her reading of Wittgenstein’s private 
language argument. Anscombe’s work on sensation and perception has not been brought into dialogue 
with contemporary theories of perception though such dialogue is richly suggested in her writing. 
Anscombe offers conceptual clarification of core terms, including subjective, intentional, object (as in 
‘object of sight’), mental event, observation, colour. In each case she looks to articulate the ‘grammar’ (or 
form) of the concepts these words represent and to dissolve or resolve philosophical problems through 
this descriptive work. What emerges is a distinctive position that rejects sense-data-, naïve-, 
representational-, and adverbial-theories. The view is clearly rooted in Wittgenstein’s private language 
argument, but goes far beyond the former’s destructive conclusions.  For memory see *Metaphysics*. 
 
Self-consciousness and ‘I’ 
Anscombe 1975 argues that ‘I’ is not a referring expression, a thesis also associated with Wittgenstein. 
Kenny 1979 and Malcolm 1979 accept the no-reference view, stressing its Wittgenesteinian roots. 
However, almost all contemporary analytic philosophers reject this view; Evans 1982 has been an 
especially influential work and contains many criticisms of Anscombe. It is clear from her 1975 and 1976 
that Anscombe sees her views on ‘I’ as intimately connected to her accounts of action and bodily 
awareness. Work to connect these parts of her thought is starkly absent. All the post-1982 commentary 
pieces listed (Evans 1982, Harcourt 2000, McDowell 1998, O’Brien 1994) accuse her of a residual form of 
Cartesianism, in the form of a failure to appreciate fully that the referent need not be an ego, but may be a 
human being, a person or a body.    
 
Anscombe, G. E. M. “The First Person.” In Mind and Language: Wolfson College Lectures 1974. Edited 
by S. Guttenplan, 21–36. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975. 
Classic paper arguing by reductio that ‘I’ is not a referring expression (nor ‘I am EA’ an identity 
proposition), and offering a novel account of self-consciousness in terms of the capacity to employ the 
first-person pronoun.  
 Anscombe, G. E. M. “The Subjectivity of Sensation.” Ajatus: Yearbook of the Philosophical Society of 
Finland 36 (1976): 3–18.  
Account of what is meant in calling sensation ‘subjective’; argues that the account requires that we reject 
the thesis that ‘I’ is a referring expression.  
 
Evans, Gareth. The Varieties of Reference, ch. 7. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982. 
Ch. 7 is Evans’ account of self-reference through ‘I’ and includes an influential dismissal of Anscombe’s 
1975. 
 
Harcourt, Edward. “The First Person: Problems of Sense and Reference.” Royal Institute of Philosophy 
Supplement 46 (March 2000): 25–46. 
Critical commentary on Anscombe 1975, arguing that Anscombe’s reductio fails to support its conclusion; 
it shows only that ‘I’ is not associated with a sense, and not that it is not associated with a reference.  
 
Kenny, Anthony. “The First Person.” In Intention and Intentionality: Essays in Honour of G. E. M. 
Anscombe. Edited by Cora Diamond and Jennifer Teichman, 3–14. Sussex: Harvester Press, 1979. 
Rare in agreeing with the no-reference thesis. Contains a critical discussion of status of the Cartesian 
proposition: ‘I am the thinker of these thoughts’.  
 
Malcolm, Norman. “Whether ‘I’ is a Referring Expression.” In Intention and Intentionality: Essays in 
Honour of G. E. M. Anscombe. Edited by Cora Diamond and Jennifer Teichman, 15–24. Sussex: 
Harvester Press, 1979. 
Defence of Anscombe, illuminating connections with Wittgenstein’s Blue Book remarks. 
 
McDowell, John. “Referring to Oneself.” In The Philosophy of P. F. Strawson. Edited by Lewis E. Hahn, 
129–145. Chicago: Open Court, 1998. 
Critical comparison with Strawson’s description of use of “I” without criteria of subject identity.  
 
O’Brien, Lucy. “Anscombe and the Self-Reference Rule.” Analysis 54:4 (1994): 77–81.  
Rejects the no-reference thesis, but suggests that Anscombe’s argument identifies a special 
epistemological capacity relating to ‘I’-use. 
 
Sensation and Perception 
Anscombe’s papers on sensation and perception remain almost unread. This is an enormous loss to the 
philosophy of mind and perception. These three papers (Anscombe 1965, Anscombe 1976, Anscombe 
1981), when read together, constitute a thoroughgoing and distinctive attack on traditional accounts of 
mental phenomena. Anscombe 1965—discussed in Crane 2001—presents a unique account of the 
intentionality of perception, one which attacks the root of the dilemma between representational and 
object-based accounts of perceptual experience. In her 1976, Anscombe shows how ambiguity about the 
meaning of ‘subjectivity’ has led philosophers to characterise sensory judgment as involving a distinctive 
kind of infallibility.   
 
Anscombe, G. E. M. “The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature.”’ In Analytic Philosophy—
Second Series. Edited by R. J. Butler, 158-80. Oxford: Blackwell, 1965. 
Brilliant paper. Anscombe clarifies the meaning of ‘object’ in ‘object of sense’ and demonstrates the 
radical implications for philosophy of perception when it is treated as a grammatical category rather than 
as introducing an entity. 
 
Anscombe, G. E. M. “The Subjectivity of Sensation.” Ajatus: Yearbook of the Philosophical Society of 
Finland 36 (1976): 3–18.  
Detailed discussion of the senses in which sensation can (and cannot) be said to be ‘subjective’; 
conclusions connected with Anscombe 1975 and Wittgenstein’s private language argument. 
 
Anscombe, G. E. M. “Events in the Mind”. In Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind: Collected 
Philosophical Papers II, 56-63. London: Blackwell, 1981. 
Deep but difficult analysis of the idea of a mental event or object of consciousness. Contains an insightful 
discussion of Descartes’ transformation of the notion of cogitatio into that of consciousness. 
 
Crane, Tim. “Intentional Objects.” Ratio 14 (2001): 336–49. 
Useful overview of the history and significance of the concept of an ‘intentional object’ and only significant 
discussion of Anscombe 1965. 
 
Ethics and Religion 
Anscombe is usually credited, along with her friend and colleague Philippa Foot, with the modern revival 
of virtue ethics. Her much anthologised ‘**Modern Moral Philosophy**’ (1958) is a highly polemical piece 
which argues for the use of Aristotelian virtue terms in ethics and rejects consequentialist and 
deontological ethical theories (the latter, she argues, are incoherent when removed from a theistic 
framework). This paper is part of a cluster written between 1956-8, in which Anscombe attacks both the 
moral philosophy of her contemporaries and the prevailing ethical outlook of the country at large, both of 
which she claims to be consequentialist in spirit (see ‘**Does Oxford Moral Philosophy Corrupt the 
Youth?**’ (1957) and ‘**Mr Truman’s Degree** (1956)). It was also during this time that Anscombe wrote 
**Intention** (1956). It is important to see Anscombe’s work in this period as a whole: the writings on 
*action* provide the philosophy of psychology required to sustain talk of virtuous acts and actors. Though 
Anscombe suggested the use of virtue terms in ethics, a use which she indicates could be sustained 
within a secular naturalism, she herself was a devout Catholic. Her view was that a developed virtue 
ethics would characterise as vicious just those acts which Catholicism prohibited. So for her, virtue ethics 
was a means of securing a secular ethics of prohibition. When we come to those acts that fall within the 
prohibition, Anscombe’s views have attracted outrage and condemnation (e.g. Williams and Tanner 
1972). In particular, her fierce condemnation of homosexuality, contraception, sex outside heterosexual 
marriage, euthanasia and abortion coupled with her insistence on justice over the prevention of suffering, 
have made her a target of rebuke from philosophers working in the liberal, secular and humanistic 
traditions of post-enlightenment thought.  The deep connections between Anscombe’s virtue ethics, her 
philosophy of action and mind and her conservative religious beliefs, renders Anscombe a problematic 
figure for contemporary ethicists.  
 
Anti-Consequentialism 
In ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ Anscombe coined the term ‘consequentialist’ to describe any moral 
philosopher who rejected a fundamental tenet of Hebrew-Christian morality: that there are some act-kinds 
that are prohibited in virtue of their nature alone, whatever the consequences. Anscombe finds 
consequentialism prevalent among her contemporaries at Oxford (see her 1958) and in the British public 
at large (see her 1957) and connect this attitude with support for Truman’s use of atomic weapons during 
WWII (see her 1956, listed under *Politics*). Anscombe argues that consequentialism is inevitable without 
a philosophy of psychology which can sustain an account of human action which enables the 
characterisation of the nature and quality of an act independently of consideration of its causal 
consequences. This is one of the tasks of her 1957 monograph **Intention** (see Wiseman 2016). The 
question of whether an anti-consequentialist ethics can be sustained outside a theistic framework is 
discussed in Lovibond 1973. It is worth noting that Anscombe’s use of the word ‘consequentialism’ as a 
contrast term with ‘absolutism’ does not align with philosophical usage today, according to which 
‘consequentialism’ may be consistent with prohibition and is inconsistent with virtue ethics. These 
differences are explored in Diamond 1997.  
 
Anscombe, G. E. M. “Does Oxford Moral Philosophy Corrupt the Youth?” The Listener 57 (14 Feb. 
1957):1455.  
Extremely provocative paper—written for a BBC radio broadcast; usefully read alongside Anscombe 
1958; see also letters and replies in The Listener February-April 1957.  
 
Anscombe, G. E. M. “Modern Moral Philosophy.” Philosophy, 33:124 (1958), 1-19. 
By far the most well-known and influential of Anscombe’s moral philosophy papers in which she 
introduces the term ‘consequentialism’ into the literature. 
 
Diamond, Cora. “Consequentialism in Modern Moral Philosophy and in ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’”. In 
Human Lives: Critical Essays on Consequentialist Bioethics. Edited by David S. Oderberg and Jacqueline 
A. Laing, 13—38. Palgrave Macmillan, 1997. 
Important clarification of Anscombe’s definition of ‘consequentialism’—from which contemporary 
philosophical use has somewhat departed. Suggests that Anscombe’s definition leaves space for 
characterising Mill as an anti-consequentialist.  
 
Lovibond, Sabina. “Absolute Prohibitions without Divine Promises.” In Utilitarianism: For and Against. 
Edited by J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, 82–118. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973. 
Sensitive and thought-provoking defence of secular absolutism; brings Anscombe’s 1958 into dialogue 
with Bernard Williams’ influential “Consequentialism and Integrity.”  
 
Richter, Duncan. Anscombe’s Moral Philosophy. Lexington Books, 2011. 
Currently the only book to give an overview of Anscombe’s moral philosophy; introductory. 
 
Wiseman, Rachael. “The Intended and Unintended Consequences of Intention.” In John Haldane (ed.) 
Elizabeth Anscombe: American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 90, Issue no. 2, Spring 2016, 
207-228.  
Places Intention in the context of Anscombe’s objections to Truman’s degree, Oxford moral philosophy 
and ‘the spirit of the age’ and argues for a reading of Intention based on that context. 
 
Virtue Ethics 
Anscombe’s call for a return to talk of virtue in ethics was premised on the view that without a divine 
legislator, the notion of ‘moral obligation’ is empty of ethical content. An ethics grounded in an adequate 
philosophy of psychology which made use of the Aristotelian and Thomist account of good and bad action 
would have no need such a notion (but see O’Brien 2016). Anscombe thought that the class of vicious 
actions would be the same as those actions which Hebrew-Christian ethics says are illicit (‘**Modern 
Moral Philosophy**’ 1958). Her work in virtue ethics is largely concerned with what she saw as necessary 
preparatory conceptual work in the philosophy of psychology (see, for example, ‘On Brute Facts’ 1958). 
That work seeks to provide an account of human action which enables the identification of the ‘nature and 
quality of an act’ (see her 1982). This requires an account of acts in which an agent’s intentions can be 
seen as constituting her actions’ nature. In tandem to Anscombe’s work, Philippa Foot sought to develop 
an account of human nature which would frame a secular understanding of the proper purpose of a 
human life (2001). The standard work in Anscombian virtue ethics is Hursthouse 1999. Vogler (2002 and 
2006) has taken this project forward, while pointing out some of the deep difficulties involved in detaching 
Anscombe’s ethics from its Thomist underpinnings.  
  
Anscombe, G. E. M. “On Brute Facts.” Analysis, 18:3 (1958), 69-72.  
Usefully read alongside Anscombe 1958 and 1957; shows why Anscombe thought ethics impossible 
without a sound philosophy of psychology and indicates the way in which her 1957 is conceived to 
provide such foundation. 
 
Anscombe, G. E. M. “‘Good and Bad Human Action.” in Human Life, Action and Ethics. Edited by M. 
Geach and L. Gormally, 195-206. St. Andrew’s Studies in Philosophy and Public Affairs; Exeter: Imprint 
Academic, 2005.  
Casts light on Anscombe’s controversial rejection of the prefix ‘moral’ (e.g. ‘morally bad action’) in her 
1958 by putting it in the context of Aristotle’s virtue ethics. 
 
Anscombe, G. E. M. ‘Action, Intention and “Double Effect”.’ Proceedings of the American Catholic 
Philosophical Association, 56 (1982), 12-25. 
Usefully read alongside 1958 and 1957. This paper relates Anscombe’s account of action to her ethical 
absolutism and her reading of the Thomist doctrine that all human action is moral action.  
 
Foot, Philippa, Natural Goodness. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001. 
An important book in the revival of virtue ethics, contributing to the project set out in Anscombe 1958. 
Argues for a naturalist, secular virtue ethics.  
 
Hursthouse, Rosalind. On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press (1999). 
Classic statement and defence of virtue ethics, heavily indebted to Anscombe who is discussed 
throughout.  
 
O’Brien, Matthew B. “On Obligation and the Virtues of Law” in Gormally, Luke, David Albert Jones and 
Roger Teichmann (eds), The Moral Philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe, Imprint Academia (2016), 75-97. 
Argues that Anscombe is a moral pluralist—rather than a straightforward virtue theorist—and constructs 
from her later writings on authority an account of obligation. 
Vogler, Candace, Reasonably Vicious. Harvard: Harvard University Press (2002). 
Brilliant monograph, demonstrating the productiveness of Anscombian / Thomist accounts of good (and 
bad) action, and their relevance to contemporary ethics. 
 
Vogler, Candace. “Modern Moral Philosophy Again: Isolating the Promulgation Problem.” Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society 106 (2006): 347-364 
Friendly to virtue ethics, but arguing that there is a deep problem for naturalist virtue ethics, parallel to 
that highlighted by Anscombe 1958 for atheist deontological theorists.   
  
Religion and Applied Ethics 
Anscombe wrote on applied ethics mainly for Catholic audiences. Her discussions of war, nuclear 
weapons, murder and judicial injustice (in her 1939 and 1961), though against the ‘spirit of the age’ (as 
she put it in her 1957), are palatable to contemporary secular ethical thought, and have attracted some 
careful and sympathetic discussion. However, on the topics of sex, contraception, and abortion (e.g. 
1972), Anscombe’s views remain beyond the pale for liberal secular readers; within philosophical circles 
these writings have been on the whole either ignored, mocked or violently attacked (for example, Williams 
and Tanner 1972 is a vicious attack on her 1972). Winch (1972) and Teichman (1979) are rare examples 
in which Anscombe’s arguments have been rigorously discussed, and their conclusions rejected on their 
own terms. Richter 2011 arranges his discussion of Anscombe’s ethics around these topics. See also 
*Politics and Law*. A different, and potentially more rewarding, way into Anscombe’s religious outlook is 
to focus on her understanding of the ‘spiritual nature of man’ (Muller 2016).  
 
Anscombe, G. E. M. The Justice of the Present War Examined (Oxford, 1939) (published by authors). 
Reprinted in [c] 
Skilful application of just war theory to the case of World War II; prescient in its description of the direction 
in which the war would unfold. 
 
Anscombe, G. E. M. “War and Murder.” In Nuclear Weapons: A Catholic Response. Edited by W. Stein, 
(London: Burns and Oates, 1961). Reprinted in [c] 
Attack on pacifism and on the view of Christianity as predominantly a religion of love rather than—as 
Anscombe thinks—one of justice. Anscombe (1981c) describes this paper as written in a ‘tone of 
righteous fury’.  
 
Anscombe, G. E. M. “Contraception and Chastity.” The Human World, 7 (1972), 9-30. 
The most widely read of Anscombe’s many papers on sex and chastity. Argues that sexual acts which 
involve contraception are deviant and against the natural law. She relies on the claim that the intentional 
act that is performed when contraception is used is different from that performed without contraception 
during infertile periods, and in this way puts to work the account developed in her 1957 monograph 
Intention. 
 
Richter, Duncan. Anscombe’s Moral Philosophy. Plymouth: Lexington, 2011.  
Solid if introductory study of Anscombe’s moral philosophy, important as it is the only one. Richter 
sketches connections between Anscombe’s work on intention and her moral philosophy, with case 
studies on war and sex.   
 Anselm Winfred Muller, “The Spiritual Nature of Man” in Gormally, Luke, David Albert Jones and Roger 
Teichmann (eds), The Moral Philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe, Imprint Academia (2016), 10-32. 
Sympathetic and illuminating exploration of Anscombe’s understanding of man’s ‘spirituality’, the centre of 
which is our ‘orientation toward truth and goodness’.    
 
Williams, Bernard and Michael Tanner, “Comment on ‘Contraception and Chastity’.” The Human World 9 
(1972), 41—51.  
Angry and polemical attack on Anscombe’s views on sexuality, representative of the reaction of many 
secular liberal readers.  
 
Winch, Peter, “A Letter to the Editor.” The Human Word 9 (1972). 
Winch applies pressure to Anscombe’s distinction between intrinsically generative and intrinsically non-
generative acts in order to undermine her claim that contraceptive sex is disordered while sex timed to be 
during the infertile period is not.  
 
Politics and Law 
Anscombe’s Intention is a work in the philosophy of psychology, but her interest in that topic stemmed, at 
least in part, from practical concern with matters of politics and law. In particular, she sought to 
understand—in order to undermine—the source a cluster of ideas that she saw as representative of the 
‘spirit of the age’: that murder was sometimes permissible but that the death penalty was not; that 
concerns of justice should give way to the prevention of suffering; that pacifism was admirable, but that 
total war acceptable (see Anscombe ‘**Mr Truman’s Degree**’ (1956), ‘**Does Oxford Moral Philosophy 
Corrupt the Youth** (1957), ‘**War and Murder**’ (1961), ‘**On Justice in a Trial**’ (1972)). In each case, 
she diagnoses a lack of clarity about core concepts, in particular, the concepts of intention, responsibility 
and action. (See *Action*). Her uncompromising commitment to justice over the prevention of suffering, 
her rejection of leniency when it comes to illicit acts and her adherence to the Socratic idea of a citizen’s 
duty of ultimate submission to the state (1978), make her thought a provocative counterpoint to the 
prevailing liberal ideology. Her novel analysis of the concepts of rights and promises locates their source 
in Aristotelian necessities and, as discussed in Vogler 2016, poses a challenge to recent Rawlsian 
accounts of the institution of promising.    
 
Anscombe, G. E. M. “Does Oxford Moral Philosophy Corrupt the Youth?” The Listener 57 (14 Feb. 
1957):1455.  
Written as a radio broadcast for the BBC; an attack on the consequentialist ‘spirit of the age’, as it 
manifests in policy, jurisdiction, institutions and public sympathy. Read alongside her 1958 (‘Modern 
Moral Philosophy’). Attracted venomous letters from her contemporaries, published with her non-
conciliatory replies in subsequent editions of The Listener. 
 
Anscombe, G. E. M. Mr Truman’s Degree. (Oxford: Oxonion Press, 1956). Reprinted in [c].  
Anscombe’s intervention to prevent Oxford University awarding an honorary degree to USA President 
Harry S. Truman. Contains many of the themes of Intention (1957), ‘Does Oxford Moral Philosophy 
Corrupt the Youth?’ (1957), and ‘Modern Moral Philosophy (1958). 
 
Anscombe, G. E. M. “War and Murder.” In Nuclear Weapons: A Catholic Response. Edited by W. Stein, 
(London: Burns and Oates, 1961). Reprinted in [c] 
Polemical piece, defending the right of a country to go to war and the right of a state to coerce its citizens 
by violence; sheds light on Anscombe’s opposition to ‘moral principles’ (in her ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, 
1958).  
 
Anscombe, G. E. M. “On Promising and its Justice, and Whether it Need be Respected in Foro Interno”, 
Critica, 3/7-8 (1969), 61-83. Reprinted in [c]. 
Brilliant discussion of Hume’s puzzle about the ‘naturally unintelligibility’ of promising and the distinction 
between rights arising out of in Aristotelian necessity and those arising out of convention. Read with  
Anscombe 1978.  
 
Anscombe, G. E. M. “On the Source of the Authority of the State.” Ratio, 20/1 (1978). Reprinted in [c]. 
Anscombe argues that states have the right to be obeyed in the exercise of institutional violent coercive 
power. She introduces the idea of ‘authority stemming from a task’ to account for this right. Contains an 
excellent discussion of the notion of a ‘right’ and related modals, in this case Aristotelian necessities. 
Read with Anscombe 1969. 
 
Anscombe, G. E. M. (with J. Feldman) ‘On the Nature of Justice in a Trial’, Analysis, 33/2 (1972), 33-6. 
Written in the style of Swift’s modest proposal, a scathing attack on the Home Office Report proposing to 
end the privilege of Catholic priests to withhold information learned in confessionals; clear expression of 
Anscombe’s view that Justice must never be sacrificed in the name of expedience.    
 
Vogler, Candace, “Anscombe on Promising” in Gormally, Luke, David Albert Jones and Roger Teichmann 
(eds), The Moral Philosophy of Elizabeth Anscombe, Imprint Academia (2016), 119-132. 
Puts Anscombe into dialogue with Scanlon and Rawls. 
 
 
